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Stripping Away Employment Rights:
The Unconscionability of Class
Waivers in Employment Agreements
Herzfeld v. 1416 Chancellor, Inc., 2015 WL 4480829 (E.D. Pa. 2015).
NIKKI CLARK*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1925, Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which established
a public policy in favor of arbitration.1 For the next six decades, courts undermined
the FAA by not allowing arbitration for federal statutory claims through the nonarbitrability doctrine.2 Not until the 1980s did the Supreme Court reversed its stance
on arbitration and began to require arbitration under the FAA for certain federal
statutory claims.3
As support for arbitration clauses began to grow, employers began to include
arbitration clauses in employment agreements because it lowers the cost and uncertainty of litigation.4 Many of these arbitration clauses contain waivers of the right
to class action.5 Recently, in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, the United States Supreme Court held that the FAA preempts state laws that prohibit contracts from
disallowing class-wide contracts.6
The constitutionality of arbitration clauses in contracts did not end with Concepcion. Employment contracts that contain arbitration clauses are still an issue for
the courts. In Herzfeld v. 1416 Chancellor, the district court found that the arbitration clause included in the employment agreement was unconscionable.7 A case
decided in Connecticut that involved the same employers found the arbitration

*B.A., Arkansas State University 2014, J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law 2017.
I would like to thank the editorial staff of the Journal of Dispute Resolution for the time spent helping
edit this Note as well as Professors Desnoyer, Newman, and Gely for their help with this Note.
1. Elizabeth A. Roma, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Employment Contracts and the Need for
Meaningful Judicial Review, 12 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 519, 522 (2004).
2. David Horton, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, Purposivism, and State Public Policy, 101
GEO. L.J. 1217, 1232 (2013). For six decades, courts refused to compel arbitration of federal statutory
claims. The nonarbitrability doctrine rested on the premise the litigation was superior to arbitration. Id.
3. Id. at 1233. See also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985) (holding that arbitrating a federal statutory claim did not mean the surrender of substantive rights
but “trading the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality,
and expedition of arbitration.”).
4. Alexander J.S Colvin, From Supreme Court to Shopfloor: Mandatory Arbitration and the Reconfiguration of Workplace Dispute Resolution, 13 CORNELL J.L & PUB. POL’Y 581, 582-83 (2004).
5. Thomas G. Yoxall & Seth Roberts, Class Action Waiver Provisions, 39 ADVOC. (TEX.) 26, 26
(2007).
6. AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act
preempts state laws that prohibit contracts form disallowing class-wide arbitration).
7. Id. Herzfeld v. 1416 Chancellor, Inc., 2015 WL 4480829 (E.D. Pa. 2015).
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clause included in the employment agreement was not unconscionable.8 This Note
discusses how courts have handled arbitration clauses in employment contracts and
whether waivers of class and collective arbitration action are unconscionable. A
federal circuit court split currently exists concerning whether waivers of class and
collective arbitration actions are unconscionable. This Note argues that a waiver of
collective action, whether express or unknowing, should be per se unconscionable
to provide consistency and to resolve the inconsistency between and even within
federal circuits.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Jessica Herzfeld began working at the Gold Club, an exotic dance club in Pennsylvania, while she was in college in 2006.9 After she began working, Herzfeld
signed an agreement but could not recall the subject or terms of the agreement and
the managers who worked at the Gold Club when Herzfeld was first hired could not
recall giving Herzfeld any paperwork to sign.10 The club owner, who claimed that
Herzfeld signed an arbitration agreement when she first began working in 2006,
alleged that a 2009 flood destroyed that agreement.11 Herzfeld continued working
for four more years after the 2009 flood without a signed agreement.12 During this
time period, Herzfeld also worked at other clubs.13
On August 30, 2013, the Club presented Herzfeld with a new Stage Rental License Agreement, which contained an arbitration agreement.14 This agreement was
the subject of their dispute.15 Kristen Angelucci, a representative of the Gold Club,
told Herzfeld that she could no longer work at the Gold Club if she did not sign the
agreement.16 When asked to sign the document, Herzfeld asked if she could take
the document home because she had already paid for her stage time and she wanted
more time to review the document at home.17 Herzfeld was told that she could not
take the document home, so she then quickly read over the document and signed
it.18
During Herzfeld’s time at the Gold Club, the owners classified all dancers that
worked at the club as independent contractors instead of employees.19 Because the

8. D’Antuono v. Serv. Rd., 789 F.Supp. 2d 308, 327-30 (2011) (holding that the arbitration clause
was not procedurally or substantively unconscionable because the clause was located on the same page
where the dancers signed their name and the dancers did not have unequal bargaining power).
9. Herzfeld, 2015 WL 4480829, at *1.
10. Id. At trial, the owner of the Gold Club alleged that Herzfeld signed an arbitration agreement
when she first began working. Absent a signed document, the owner looked to its standard paperwork
that is usually given to a new hire: an “Entertainer Information Sheet,” a “Commitment to a Drug Free
Environment,” a “Stage Rental License Agreement,” and an “Entertainer’s Rules, Regulations, and
Proper Conduct.” Absent the allegation by the club owner, there is no proof that any document Herzfeld
signed before 2013 contained an arbitration clause. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at *2.
15. Herfeld, 2015 WL 4480829, at *2.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Complaint at *1, Herzfeld v. 1416 Chancellor, Inc., 2015 WL 4480829 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (No. 144966).
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dancers were classified as independent contractors, they were not paid the applicable minimum wage under Pennsylvania law.20 Under this classification, dancers
were also required to work in excess of 40 hours per week and were not paid for
any overtime.21 Further, the Gold Club collected a portion of the dancers’ tips from
customers.22
Herzfeld filed a lawsuit under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) on
behalf of herself and other similarly situated individuals.23 Herzfeld filed suit for
unfair practices, seeking (1) unpaid minimum wages for hours worked for which
the club owner did not pay the mandatory minimum wage, (2) unpaid overtime
wages, and (3) liquidated damages.24 Herzfeld alleged that she and the other dancers that worked at the Gold Club were employees under the FLSA.25 The Gold Club
claimed it did not have to pay the dancers the mandated minimum wage as the club
classified the dancers as independent contractors.26 Along with Herzfeld’s FLSA
claim, Herzfeld also brought a class action suit in the United States District Court
for Eastern District of Pennsylvania on behalf of all dancers who worked at the Gold
Club in Pennsylvania.27 Herzfeld’s suit included a claim for unfair practices under
the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act of 1968 and the Pennsylvania Wage Payment
and Collection Law, claiming the Gold Club unfairly classified the dancers as independent contractors instead of employees.28 Herzfeld’s suit also included a claim
for unfair enrichment under Pennsylvania common law.29
The Gold Club moved to compel arbitration or, in the alternative, stay the trial
court proceeding on any claim not referred to arbitration.30 The district court
granted both parties limited discovery on arbitrability.31 The court held that the
arbitration clause was procedurally and substantively unconscionable, and thus unenforceable as it caused an unknowing loss of an individual’s statutory right to bring
a collective or class arbitration action.32

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Herzfeld’s claim raises important questions about unconscionability of arbitration clauses in employment contracts. In 2011, the Supreme Court decided in AT&T
Mobility v. Concepcion that the FAA preempts state laws that prohibit contracts
from disallowing class-wide arbitration.33 Concepcion, however, dealt only with

20. Id. at *1-2.
21. Id. at *2.
22. Id.
23. Herzfeld, 2015 WL 4480829, at *2.
24. Id.
25. Complaint at *16, Herzfeld, 2015 WL 4480829.
26. Id.
27. Id. at *18.
28. Herzfeld, 2015 WL 4480829, at *2.
29. Complaint at *19, Herzfeld, 2015 WL 4480829.
30. Herzfeld, 2015 WL 4480829, at *3.
31. Id. The Supreme Court distinguishes between challenges to the contract in general and challenges
to the arbitration provision specifically. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006).
An arbitrator decides challenges to the validity of the contract as a whole and the court decides specific
challenges to the arbitration clause. Id. at 444, 449.
32. Herzfeld, 2015 WL 4480829, at *13.
33. AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 334 (2011).
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consumer contracts—not employment contracts.34 The district court’s ruling in
Herzfeld addressed a question left open by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Concepcion. The court in Herzfeld and other federal courts have found that waivers of
collective arbitration are unconscionable. This section examines (1) the history of
the FAA and how the Act impacts arbitration and state law, (2) how the Fair Labor
Standards Act changes the implications of the FAA, and (3) the current circuit split
on the unconscionability of arbitration clauses in employment contracts.

A. Federal Arbitration Act
The FAA was enacted on February 12, 1925 in response to widespread judicial
hostility to arbitration agreements.35 The FAA provides that any contract that includes an arbitration provision is enforceable except where a contract is unenforceable by law.36
The United States Supreme Court held that the FAA was designed “to overrule
the judiciary’s longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate . . . and place
such agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.”37 The House Report
that accompanied the FAA explained Congress’ intention in passing the FAA,
which was to minimize the costs of litigation and the solution was to make sure than
arbitration clauses included in enforceable contracts would be upheld and enforceable.38 When passing the FAA, Congress was attempting to enforce agreements
into which parties had willingly entered.39 With the passage of the FAA, issues
concerning arbitration would be resolved in favor of arbitration and thus would
eliminate the costs of litigation to determine if arbitration clauses were enforceable.40
The FAA is not without its limits, however. While the Act clearly favors arbitration, it does not require arbitration in all instances. The FAA only concerns arbitration where parties have agreed to arbitrate, and the Act does not prevent parties
who have agreed to arbitrate from excluding certain claims from the scope of an
arbitration agreement.41

34. Id. at 341.
35. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581 (2008).
36. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). “A written provision in any…contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction ...
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.” Id.
37. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474 (quoting
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S.
213, 217 (1985)).
38. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 219-20. “It is practically appropriate that the action should be taken at this time
when there is so much agitation against the costliness and delays of litigation. These matters can be
largely eliminated by agreements for arbitration, if arbitration agreements are made valid and enforceable.” Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1924)).
39. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 220.
40. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp. 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983). The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues
should be resolved in favor of arbitration. Id.
41. Volt, 489 U.S. at 511.
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In general, for a court to exercise jurisdiction under the FAA, a valid arbitration
agreement arising out of a commerce or maritime transaction must exist.42 However, as the FAA does not provide an independent basis of federal jurisdiction, a
federal court must already have subject matter jurisdiction through a source other
than an arbitration agreement, such as diversity or a claim involving a federal question, before the FAA can be applied.43 The Supreme Court has stated that under the
FAA, an arbitrator will decide a claim unless the arbitration clause itself is at issue.44
Generally, arbitrators decide challenges to the validity of contracts as a whole and
courts decide challenges to arbitration clauses.45 Thus to decide whether Herzfeld
could bring a collective class arbitration claim, the district court looked to Pennsylvania state contract law.46 While the FAA preempts state laws that disallow waivers
of class actions, the right to collective action is a statutory right guaranteed by the
Fair Labor Standards Act, which is a federal law.

B. Fair Labor Standards Act
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)47 was passed in 1938 and established a
40-hour workweek, set the national minimum wage, and guaranteed time-and-ahalf pay for overtime hours.48 Congress enacted the FLSA to correct labor conditions found to be “detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living
that is necessary for health, efficiency, and well being of workers.”49 Under the
FLSA, employees have the right to bring a collective action against an employer on
behalf of him or herself and similarly situated employees.50 This guarantee is only
available to those individuals who are considered employees, not independent contractors.51 The FLSA defines an employee as “any individual employed by an employer.”52 To determine whether an individual is covered under the FLSA as an
employee, courts apply an economic reality test, which considers six factors:
(1) the degree of control exerted by the alleged employer over the worker;
(2) the worker’s opportunity for profit or loss;
(3) the worker’s investment in the business;
(4) the permanence of the working relationship;
(5) the degree of skill required to perform the work; and
(6) the extent to which the work is an integral part of the alleged employer’s business.53
42. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
43. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012).
44. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445-46 (2006).
45. Id. at 445.
46. Quilloin v. Tenet Health System Philadelphia, Inc. 673 F.3d 221, 228 (2012) (“State contract principles also generally determine whether an arbitration agreement is unenforceable based on any of the
‘applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.’”).
47. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2012).
48. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(2) (2012).
49. 29 U.S.C. § 202 (2012).
50. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012).
51. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012).
52. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2012).
53. Baker v. Flint Engineering & Const. Co., 137 F.3d 1436, 1440 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Henderson
v. Inter-Chem Coal Co., Inc., 41 F.3d 567 (10th Circ. 1994)).
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None of the above factors are by themselves dispositive and courts must employ a totality of the circumstances approach.54
The provisions of the FLSA protect individuals classified as employees so employers who hire independent contractors are not subject to the provisions of the
FLSA.55 Generally, independent contractors generally have more bargaining power
than employees and have a greater degree of control over their work hours and
schedules.56
Under the FLSA, employees have a statutory right to bring collective action
suits.57 A collective action under the FLSA differs from a class action within the
meaning of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.58 In a collective action,
res judicata extends only to named parties, unlike class actions under Rule 23 where
res judicata extends to the entire class.59 Members of a class under Rule 23 must
request exclusion from a lawsuit, or they will be bound by the decision.60 In a collective action, members must file a consent to join a lawsuit, but they are not bound
by the judgment if they do not consent.61 Courts have treated a collective action
under the FLSA and a Rule 23 class action as separate causes of action since the
passage of the FLSA.62
Although employees have a statutory right to collective action under the FLSA,
courts have found that the right can be waived.63 Under Pennsylvania law, a waiver
of a right is the “voluntary and intentional abandonment or relinquishment of a
known right.”64 To constitute a waiver of a right, there must be a “clear, unequivocal and decisive act of the party” with knowledge of the right and an “evident
purpose to surrender” the right.65

C. Unconscionability
There is currently a circuit split concerning the unconscionability of arbitration
clauses in employment contracts. D’Antuono v. Service Road Corporation, a case
factually similar to Herzfeld, was decided in 2011.66 However, unlike the Herzfeld
court, the court in D’Antuono found that the arbitration clause in the Stage Rental
License agreement was not unconscionable.67 In D’Antuono, three exotic dancers
filed suit against the Gold Club, the same entity sued in Herzfeld, in the Federal
District Court of Connecticut.68 The dancers filed suit under the FLSA, asserting a
54. Id. at 1441.
55. Bolduc v. National Semiconductor Corp., 35 F.Supp. 2d 106, 111 (D. Me. 1998).
56. Baker, 137 F.3d at 1441.
57. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012).
58. Amelia W. Koch, et al., Individualizing the FLSA: Collective Action Waivers and the Split in the
Federal Courts, 13 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 99, 99 (2012).
59. Woods v. New York Life Ins. Co., 686 F.2d 578, 579-80 (7th Cir. 1982).
60. Roshto v. Chrysler Corp., 67 F.R.D. 28, 29 (E.D. La. 1975).
61. Id.
62. Koch, et al., supra note 58, at 99.
63. Herzfeld v. 1416 Chancellor Inc., 2015 WL 4480829, at *10 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (citing AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 341-42 (2011).
64. Kamco Indus. Sales, Inc., v. Lovejoy, Inc., 779 F.Supp. 2d 416, 423 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (quoting
Prime Medical Assocs. v. Valley Forge Ins. Co., 970 A.2d 1149, 1156 (Pa. 2009)).
65. Id. at 423 (quoting Brown v. City of Pittsburgh, 409 Pa. 357, 360 (Pa. 1962)).
66. D’Antuono v. Serv. Rd. Corp., 789 F.Supp.2d 308 (2011).
67. Id. at 328.
68. Id. at 317.
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claim of unfair practices because the owners classified the dancers as independent
contractors instead of employees.69

1. D’Antuono v. Service Road Corp.
The plaintiffs in D’Antuono objected to the arbitration clause in their Stage
Rental License agreement for three reasons.70 First, the arbitration clause provided
that entertainers could not bring collective or class arbitration claims.71 Second, the
clause obtained a cost- and fee-shifting provision requiring the losing party to pay
for costs incurred for court proceedings and reasonable attorney’s fees.72 Third,
under the arbitration clause, all claims against the Gold Club had to be filed within
six months after the dancers’ last day of work.73 The arbitration clause in Herzfeld
also contained a cost- and fee-shifting provision, but it did not contain an explicit
provision prohibiting class arbitration.74 The arbitration clause instead stated,
“[A]ny disputes arising out of this agreement . . . shall be settled by arbitration.”75
The first issue the court had to address in D’Antuono was whether the plaintiffs
agreed to arbitration.76 Plaintiffs conceded they signed the Stage Rental License,
which contained an arbitration clause.77 After determining that plaintiffs had agreed
to arbitration, the court determined whether the arbitration clause was enforceable.78
The Gold Club filed a Motion to Dismiss/or Stay the Action.79 After oral argument
on the motion to dismiss, the district court issued an order that directed the Gold
Club to give the court a “yes” or “no” answer concerning whether the Gold Club
intended to enforce the cost- and fee-shifting provision and the statute of limitations
provision.80 The Gold Club filed notice that it would not enforce either provision
of the arbitration clause.81
In Connecticut, an unconscionable contract is one that “no man in his senses,
not under delusion would make, on the one hand, and which no fair and honest man
would accept on the other.”82 The contract must be so unfair and unreasonable that
no reasonable person would willingly enter into the contract.83 Under Connecticut
law, to succeed on an unconscionability claim the moving party must show that an
69. Id. at 313.
70. Id. at 320-21.
71. Id. at 320-22. “Entertainer agrees that all claims between her and the club will be litigated individually and that she will not consolidate or seek class treatment for a claim.” Id. at 316-17.
72. D’Antuono, 789 F.Supp. 2d at 320-21 (“Any judgment, order, or ruling arising out of a dispute
between the parties shall award costs incurred for the proceedings and reasonable attorney fees to the
prevailing party.”).
73. Id. at 321 (“Entertainer further agrees not to commence any action, suit or arbitration proceeding
relating, in any manner whatsoever, to this lease of the club, more than six months after she last performed at the premises, and further agrees to waive any statute of limitations to the contrary.”).
74. Herzfeld v. 1416 Chancellor, Inc., 2015 WL 4480829, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (“Licensor and licensee shall each pay their own costs and expenses of arbitration including but not limited to their own
respective attorneys face if any.”).
75. Id. at *5.
76. D’Antuono, 789 F.Supp. 2d at 320.
77. Id. at 316.
78. Id. at 327.
79. Id. at 317.
80. Id. at 318.
81. D’Antuono, 789 F.Supp. 2d at 318.
82. Id. at 327.
83. Id.
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absence of meaningful choice existed (procedural unconscionability) and that the
terms of the agreement were unreasonably favorable toward the other party (substantive unconscionability).84 A moving party must separately prove both procedural unconscionability and substantive unconscionability to succeed on a claim of
unconscionability.85 However, in some circumstances, Connecticut courts will find
a contract is unenforceable on substantive unconscionability alone, even where procedural unconscionability does not exist.86 By contrast, under Pennsylvania law,
courts determine unconscionability on a sliding scale.87

2. Procedural Unconscionability
The D’Antuono court found that the plaintiffs could not prove the arbitration
clause was procedurally unconscionable.88 One of the plaintiffs in D’Antuono did
not sign a Stage Rental License Agreement, and the court held that she was not
bound by the arbitration agreement.89 Two of the plaintiffs in D’Antuono argued
that the arbitration clause was procedurally unconscionable because the clause was
“hidden in a maze of fine print,” because no effort was made to alert the plaintiffs
of the clause, and because the parties had unequal bargaining power.90 The court
disagreed, reasoning that the arbitration clause was written in ordinary size type and
that it appeared on the same page where both plaintiffs signed their names.91 After
making that determination, the court addressed the plaintiff’s argument that the contract was presented in a take-it-or-leave-it manner, which was substantially the same
argument that Herzfeld presented in her case.92
Some courts have held that the take-it-or-leave-it nature of a contract is per se
procedurally unconscionable; Connecticut does not have such a rule.93 In D’Antuono, the court found that the contract was presented in a take-it-or-leave-it manner, but this was not enough to make the contract procedurally unconscionable.94

3. Substantive Unconscionability
Not only did the court in D’Antuono find that the plaintiffs could not prove the
contract was procedurally unconscionable, but the court also found that the plaintiffs could not prove the contract was substantively unconscionable.95 The court
first found that plaintiffs did not cite any case in which either the Connecticut Su-

84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Herzfeld v. 1416 Chancellor, Inc., 2015 WL 4480829, at *8 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (“[W]here the procedural unconscionability is very high, a lesser degree of substantive unconscionability may be required
and presumably vice versa.”).
88. D’Antuono, 789 F.Supp. 2d at 327-28.
89. Id. at 325.
90. Id. at 328.
91. Id.
92. Id.; Herzfeld, 2015 WL 4480829, at *9.
93. D’Antuono, 789 F.Supp. 2d at 328.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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preme Court or Appellate Court, applying Connecticut law, struck down an arbitration clause as substantively unconscionable.96 The only case that the court could
point to where the Connecticut Supreme Court considered the issue of whether an
arbitration clause was substantively unconscionable applied New York law.97
The court further stated that even if the owners of the Gold Club had decided
to enforce the cost- and fee-shifting and statute of limitations provisions, the provisions of the arbitration clause were not enough to constitute substantive unconscionability.98 The court held that the three provisions of the contract to which plaintiffs
objected, taken together, were not enough to make the contract unconscionable.99

4. Circuit Split
Of the 13 circuit courts, six have held that agreements that contain a waiver of
collective action under FLSA are enforceable: First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth,
and Eleventh Circuits.100 Even among these circuits, a split still exists regarding
what makes a permissible waiver and what level of stringency should be applied.101
The First Circuit and many district courts in the Second Circuit have decided that
employers have the burden to prove a permissive waiver occurred.102 The Fourth,
Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits do not place a high burden on the employer to
prove a permissive waiver.103 The decision in Concepcion, although it provided
major support for the FAA, it did not serve a solution to the circuit split.

D. AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion
In 2011, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Concepcion and held that
arbitration clauses that disallowed class-wide arbitration were not presumptively
unconstitutional.104 Concepcion however, differs from both Herzfeld and D’Antuono in that it involved a consumer contract.
Vincent and Liza Concepcion bought cell phones from AT&T Mobility that
were advertised as free.105 The Concepcions were required to pay the sales tax on
the phones.106 The couple filed a complaint, which was consolidated with a class
action, for false advertising.107 The contract that the Concepcions signed contained
an arbitration clause stating all disputes between the parties would be settled via
arbitration and it required any claim brought by a plaintiff must be settled on an
individual basis.108 AT&T Mobility filed a motion to compel arbitration.109 The
district court denied the motion basing its decision on the California rule announced
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 329.
Id.
Id.
D’Antuono, 789 F.Supp. 2d at 329.
Koch, et al., supra note 58, at 104.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S 333, 337 (2011).
Id.
Id. at 338.
Id. at 337.
Id. at 337-38.
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in Discover Bank v. Superior Court.110 In this case, the California Supreme Court
held that a waiver of class arbitration in a consumer contract of adhesion is unconscionable under certain circumstances and should not be enforced.111 The district
court denied the motion because AT&T could not prove that the bilateral arbitration
agreement substituted for the deterrent effects of class actions.112 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed this decision holding that the Discover Bank rule was not preempted by
the FAA.113
The Supreme Court found that the FAA preempts any conflicting state law that
prohibits the arbitration of a claim outright.114 The Court found that class arbitration
could be inconsistent with the FAA for three reasons.115 First, class arbitration nullifies the main advantage of arbitration — its informality — and makes the process
of arbitration slower and more expensive.116 Second, class arbitration cannot be
accomplished without procedural formality, which defeats the purpose of arbitration.117 Third, class arbitration increases risks to defendants because multilayered
review makes it more likely that errors will go uncorrected.118 The Supreme Court
found that the Discover Bank rule “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,” and thus was preempted
by the FAA.119

IV. INSTANT DECISION
The district court in Herzfeld addressed Concepcion but ultimately found that
Concepcion did not address the question before the district court.120 After Herzfeld
brought suit, the owners of the Gold Club moved to compel arbitration under the
arbitration clause in the Stage Rental License Agreement.121 The district court
granted limited discovery on arbitrability.122 The court found that Herzfeld was not
permitted to arbitrate her FLSA collective action or class action under the 2013
arbitration clause, but that the loss of the right to arbitrate a collective or class action
was unconscionable under Pennsylvania contract law.123
The Third Circuit has held that the district court has the authority to decide if
an agreement to arbitrate authorizes class arbitration absent “clear and unmistakable
evidence” to the contrary.124 Under Pennsylvania law, courts have found that reference to the American Arbitration Association’s rules on collective or class actions
110. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Ca. 2005) overruled by AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
111. Id. at 114.
112. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 338.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 343.
115. Id. at 348.
116. Id.
117. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 348.
118. Id. at 349.
119. Id. at 350.
120. Herzfeld v. 1416 Chancellor, Inc., 2015 WL 4480829, at *10 (E.D. Pa. 2015).
121. Id., at *2-3.
122. Id. at *3.
123. Id. at *8, *13.
124. Id. at *5 (citing Opalinkski v. Robert Half Intern, Inc., 761 F.3d 326, 329 (3d Cir. 2014)). The
arbitration agreement provided for arbitration of any dispute of a FLSA claim arising out of or relating
to their employment. It was silent on the availability of class arbitration. Consequently, the court of
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constitutes clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties agreed to have an arbitrator decide whether he or she can resolve a class-wide claim.125 The 2013 arbitration clause in the Stage Rental License Agreement did not reference the American Arbitration Association rules.126 The agreement merely stated that the arbitration “shall be final and conclusive and binding upon both parties.”127
Because Herzfeld and the club owner did not clearly and unmistakably agree
that an arbitrator would decide whether a party could bring a collective or class
arbitration action, the district court looked to whether a collective or class arbitration action fell within the scope of the 2013 arbitration clause.128 The clause refers
to arbitration involving “both parties” and does not make mention of any other parties.129 Thus, the district court found that as a matter of law the 2013 arbitration
clause did not permit Herzfeld to bring collective or class arbitration action.130
After determining that the 2013 arbitration clause did not permit Herzfeld to
bring a class arbitration claim, the court then had to decide whether the arbitration
clause was unconscionable.131 Under Pennsylvania law, the burden of proof to
prove that a clause is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable falls on
the challenging party.132 Courts look to the following factors to determine procedural unconscionability: (1) the take-it-or-leave-it nature of the standardized form
of the document, (2) the parties’ relative bargaining positions, and (3) the degree of
economic compulsion motivating the adhering party.133
The owners of the Gold Club admitted that the 2013 agreement was presented
in a take-it-or-leave-it fashion.134 The court found that a disparity in bargaining
power existed between Herzfeld and the Gold Club.135 Herzfeld was a student and
an exotic dancer at the time.136 While she worked at the club for six years, this was
not enough to put her on equal bargaining power with the owners of the club.137
The court found that while evidence of procedural unconscionability existed, procedural unconscionability was not Herzfeld’s strongest argument.138 Procedural unconscionability is sometimes evaluated on a sliding scale dependent on the substantive unconscionability analysis.139 This means that a contract can still be found
unconscionable even if it is more substantively unconscionable than procedurally
unconscionable.140
The court stated that substantive unconscionability refers to terms that are “unreasonably or grossly favorable to one side and to which the disfavored party does
appeals found the district court must decide whether the arbitration agreement permitted class arbitration.
Id.
125. Chesapeake Appalachia LLC v. Burkett, No. 12-3073, 2014 WL 5312829, at *6 (M.D. Pa. 2014).
126. Herzfeld v. 1416 Chancellor, Inc., 2015 WL 4480829, at *6 (E.D. Pa. 2015).
127. Id. at *1.
128. Id. at *5.
129. Id. at *8.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Herzfeld, 2015 WL 4480829, at *8.
133. Id. at *9.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Herzfeld, 2015 WL 4480829, at *9.
138. Id.
139. Id. at *8.
140. Id.
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not assent.”141 The FLSA provides that a party may bring an action against an employer on behalf of him or herself or other similarly situated employees.142 The
court found that the arbitration agreement caused an unknowing loss of Herzfeld’s
statutory right to collective action.143 To waive her right to collective and class
arbitration, Herzfeld would have needed to know about the right and there must
have been a clear showing that she intended to give up that right.144 The arbitration
clause made a collective or class arbitration action unavailable and as a result imposed an involuntary unknowing loss of the right to a class arbitration action.145
Thus the court found that the arbitration clause was substantively unconscionable.146

V. COMMENT
The Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion was an important decision in the
growing trend of courts upholding arbitration agreements in contracts. The Supreme Court concluded that class arbitration waivers in consumer contracts are presumptively constitutional when it held the FAA preempts state laws that prohibit
contracts from disallowing class-wide arbitration.147 After this case was handed
down, the question of whether arbitration clauses in contracts appeared to have been
finally answered. However, Concepcion and Herzfeld are distinguishable. Herzfeld
and other cases dealing with arbitration clauses in employment contracts concerned
the FLSA, a federal law, while Concepcion addressed a state law.148 Furthermore,
the FLSA guarantees employees the right to a collective action on behalf of other
similarly situated employees.149 The Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of
collective action waivers in employment and lower courts, as in Herzfeld, have attempted to answer this question with little consensus among the circuits.
Part of the problem facing courts in considering collective action waivers is the
inconsistency of state unconscionability law. Under the FAA, an arbitration agreement is not enforceable if the formation of the arbitration agreement is made under
fraud or duress, or if the terms of the agreement are unconscionable.150 Most employees challenge arbitration agreements for unconscionability.151 Under an unconscionability analysis, federal courts must interpret state law,152 which results in inconsistency. In Herzfeld, the court analyzed procedural and substantive unconscionability on a sliding scale.153 In D’Antuono, the court treated procedural and
substantive unconscionability as separate prongs of a two-part test.154 The district
court in D’Antuono mentioned that some courts have held that the take-it-or-leave141. Id. at *10.
142. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012).
143. Herzfeld, 2015 WL 4480829, at *11.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011).
148. Compare id. at 352-53, with Herzfeld, 2015 WL 4480829, at *2-3.
149. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012).
150. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 353 (Thomas, J. concurring).
151. See, e.g., id. at 336; Herzfeld, 2015 WL 4480829, at *1; D’Antuono v. Service Road Corp., 789
F.Supp. 2d 308, 323 (D. Conn. 2011).
152. Herzfeld, 2015 WL 4480829, at *8.
153. Id.
154. D’Antuono, 789 F.Supp. 2d at 327.
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it nature of a contract is per se procedurally unconscionable.155 Connecticut does
not have this rule.156 Prior to the D’Antuono case, the Connecticut Supreme Court
had only ruled on whether an arbitration clause is substantively unconscionable
once and the court was interpreting New York unconscionability law and not Connecticut unconscionability law.157 Because of this inconsistency, collective action
waivers should be considered per se unenforceable.
This approach appears similar to the law that the Supreme Court struck down
in Concepcion. However, Concepcion invalidated state laws that prohibited class
arbitration. The concerns listed by the Supreme Court are less of an issue under the
FLSA. The FLSA grants employees the statutory right to collective action, and
courts have treated collective and class actions as two separate bodies of law.158
The right to collective action under the FLSA is not an “opt-in” version of Rule 23
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.159 Collective action would not nullify the
informality of arbitration, because an arbitrator does not have to adhere to the requirements laid out in Rule 23, but the Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations.160 Collective action can be accomplished without procedural formality because collective actions are less formal than class actions. Since the passage of the
FLSA, courts have treated class and collective actions as separate, non-interchangeable bodies of law.161
Treating the waiver of collective action as per se unconscionable would eliminate differing court decisions when applying state unconscionability law. A single
rule is better for the same reason that courts have upheld consumer agreements precluding class arbitration under the FAA: efficiency. There is a split among the circuits and the Supreme Court should address this issue. Furthermore, the right to a
collective action is a remedy under the FLSA. By allowing a waiver of a collective
action, an employee is not afforded the full scope of the remedies that Congress
intended the FLSA to offer. While courts have favored arbitration, that preference
should not come at the expense of a statutory right. Congress passed the FLSA to
prevent unfair practices in employment. The waiver of the right to collective action
is an unfair practice that the FLSA is designed to protect.
By adopting a bright line rule that the waiver of collective action is per se unconscionable, would not render the FAA unenforceable. In Concepcion, the Supreme Court found that the FAA preempts state laws that ban class arbitration provisions that disallow class arbitration.162 Even if we were to completely ignore that
Concepcion concerned state law rather than a federal law like the FLSA, the FLSA
and the FAA can still coexist because the FLSA allows for collective action, which
courts have treated as a separate body of law from class actions.
Some courts have decided that arbitration agreements can contain a waiver of
collective action; however, those courts are split on what makes a permissible
155. Id. at 328.
156. Id.
157. D’Antuono, 329.
158. See generally Craig Becker & Paul Strauss, Representing Low-Wage Workers in the Absence of a
Class: The Peculiar Case of Section 16 of the Fair Labor Standards Act and Underenforcement of Minimum Labor Standards, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1317, 1322 (2008).
159. Rule 23 requires that the class be certified, that named parties are representative and typical of the
entire class, and how discovery is to be conducted. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
160. Thomas J. Cunningham, Class Actions in Arbitration, 92 ILL. B.J. 532, 533 (2004).
161. Koch, et al., supra note 58, at 99.
162. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 349.
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waiver.163 Should the employee be told that the arbitration agreement includes a
waiver of collection action? Should the waiver be in bold print so that it draws the
employee’s attention to the clause? What specific language should be included in
the agreement to constitute a permissible waiver? Among the circuits that have
decided that the right to collective action can be waived, there is no consensus.
While not as extreme as the bright line rule, the circuits who have decided that the
right to collective action can be waived still have not provided a clear and consistent
rule as to what constitutes a permissive waiver of a collective action.
The per se bright line rule would not come without its disadvantages. As with
any federal law that might conflict with a state law, there is always the possibility
of limiting the applicability of state law similar to the decision in Concepcion. Furthermore, applying a bright line rule in employment contracts could cause potential
confusion because it does not always provide for exceptions. In this case, because
the FLSA provides for collective action as a statutory remedy, the bright line rule
is appropriate.

VI. CONCLUSION
The FAA can preempt state laws that prohibit class-wide arbitration; the question still remains whether it can preempt federal laws. The Herzfeld case presented
an opportunity to explore enforcement of the FAA in the context of employment
contracts. The ruling provided that an arbitration clause is procedurally and substantively unconscionable when it causes an unknowing loss of a statutory right.
This case also added to the circuit split regarding whether waivers of collective actions under the FLSA are unconscionable. The right to a collective action is a statutory remedy provided under the FLSA. As the court stated in Herzfeld, an “arbitrator cannot offer . . . the full scope of the FLSA remedies in arbitration.”164
The increasing trend of courts favoring arbitration should not and needs not
come at the expense of a statutory right. The FLSA and the FAA can coexist with
one another. While a per se bright line rule does not come without its problems, the
efficiency it will provide outweighs any disadvantages that could arise.

163. Koch, et al., supra note 58, at 104.
164. Herzfeld v. 1416 Chancellor, Inc., 2015 WL 4480829, at *11 (E.D. Pa. 2015).
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